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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLIVE H. PRESTON, 
Plaintiff - Appellant,. 
- vs. -
GEORGE P. LAMB and T. J. SPEROS, 




STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant seeks to recover damages for personal 
injnrit>s which she sustained when she fell on the floor 
of tlw ddendants' business which she claims was due 
to nPgligence of the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'l1he lower court granted the defendants' Motion for 
Snmmar~T .Judgment and entered judgment for the de-
f Pnclants. 
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RF~LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant claims that the lffwer court erred in grant 
ing the Summary Judgment, that there are triable issues 
of fact, and that the Summary Judgment should be 
reverst>d lwrmitting a trial of the case on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The dt>f endants are the owners and operators of 
Lamb's Grill, which is located in the heart of the Salt 
Lake City business district at 169 South Main Strret. 
On December 24, the day before Christmas, the plain-
tiff, at approximately 11 :00 A.M. entered the defendants' 
restaurant to get a cup of coffee. She claims that as a 
result of the defendants' negligence, she slipped and fell 
on their linoleum floor sustaining a broken left hip. 
The plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that 
the "defendants were negligent in the manner and pro-
cedure of waxing and care of the floor of (their) busi-
ness, in applying excessive amounts of wax, and in 
maintaining a highly waxed, buffed and polished floor · 
which was unusually slippery, unsafe, and dangerous to 
persons walking upon the same; and, in addition, that 
the defendants wne negligent in that said floor was , 
maintained without any runner, carpet, wipe-up mat, 
or other floor covPring on a snowy, rainy, wet day, or 
without providing any means of protection to persons 
walking on said floor." (See amended Complaint, R. 
22-23) 
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At the time of the accident and for most of the 
morning before the accident, it had been raining and 
the sidewalks were wet (Deposition of Margaret Stoll, 
Pag0 8, LinP 1). The plaintiff had walked from her place 
of rmployment, Standard Optical, which is up the street 
from Lambs Grill. Larry Hugentobler, also an employee 
of Rtandard Optical, accompanied her. She was wearing 
a pump type shoe with a medium heel and as she walked 
to thP defendants' restaurant, the sidewalks were wet 
and her fept also were wet as she entered (See Affidavit 
of Olive H. Preston (R. 30). 
The defendants were well aware of the disagreeable 
weather on the day of the accident. At the time, no wipe-
np mats or any other type of floor covering were put 
011t to protect people coming in from the wet pavement 
onto the defendants' polished floor (See deposition of 
Mr. Lamb, Page 19, Line 1-10). 
With respect to the condition of the defendants' 
floor at the time of the accident, the plaintiff testified 
in her deposition at Page 14, Line 8 through Line 9 
that Margaret, an employee of the defendants, stated 
at the time of the accident, "That floor is awfully slip-
rwry, Olive. They waxed it last night." 
Jerry Hugentobler, who accompanied her, described 
tlw floor in his deposition at Page 8, Line 5 as: "It 
was highly polished, it was clean." 
Mr .. James H. Lee, at Page 43, Line 16-19 of his 
drposition, states that the buffing of the floor nightly 
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tak<>s all of tlw spots off and makes the floor shine and · 
look clean. 
:Mr. J,Pe is the maintenance man employed by thP 
<lPfendants and has responsibility for maintenance of 
tht> floor of their restaurant. He dPscribes in his deposi-
tion at Page 3G, Line 25, through Page 40, Line 30, the 
procedure for waxing and maintaining the floor of the 
rnstaurant. The actual waxing of the floor was done 
about the middle of August, four and one-half months 
prior to the accident (See ans,ver to plaintiff's Interrog-
atories No. 7, R. 13). According to Mr. Lee the pro-
cedure for waxing consists of first stripping the floor 
of all the old wax. This is done by mopping the floor 
with a special detergent purchased from the Magic 
Chemical Company in Salt Lake City. About two cups 
of dett>rgent is used for 2-3 gallons of water. The floor 
is rinsed after the mopping. After drying, it it waxed 
with a wax called "Guard," also purchased from Magic 
Chemical Company. The wax is applied with a wool 
applicator. -when the wool applicator is absorbed with 
wax, the practice is to wax an area of the floor of about 
3-4 square feet. The floor is then allowed to dry. Some· 
times, another coat is applied. After the wax has dried, 
it is polished with a rotary electric polishing machine. 
The day-to-day maintenance consists of sweeping 
it with a pnslt broom or a dry untreated dust mop and 
then huffing it with a rotary electric buffing machine 
(See dPposi6on of .James H. Lee, Page 42, Line 12 
through Page 43, Line 19). This had been done every 
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,1a:1 after closing hours from the time of waxing to the 
tilnP of injury. 
~fr. Douglas MacGrPgor, a mechanical engineer, 
was rPtained by the plaintiff to determine the degree 
of slipperiness of the floor on the day of the accident. 
ll1' determined the degree of slipperiness of the surface 
of drfrndants floor by measuring the coefficient of fric-
tion between the plaintiff's shoe that she was wearing 
at the time of the accident and the floor. His tests 
werP made on a floor prepared by waxing it in the same 
manrn•r and by the same procedure which Mr. James 
H. Lee described in his deposition at Pages 38, 39 and 
40. Since the injury occurred 4Yz months after waxing, 
the test floor was aged by sprinkling dust on it, sweeping 
it and polishing it some 95 times to duplicate the actual 
eondition of the floor at the time of the accident (See 
Affidavit of Douglas MacGregor, Paragraph 8; R. 25, 
26) . 
.Mr. MacGregor is of the opm10n based upon his 
knowledge and expertise, and upon the tests he con-
ducted that the coefficient of friction was so low that 
persons walking on it in a normal manner could easily 
slip and fall. He was further of the opinion that any 
time the coefficient of friction falls below 0.4, a slip-
pPry condition exists and that people walking in a norm-
al manner may slip and fall (See Affidavit of Douglas 
MacGregor, Paragraph 11; R. 27, 28). It is noted from 
Paragraph 9 (R. 27) of his Affidavit that the coefficient 
of friction of the floor tested was 0.23 with the shoe sole 
6 
and tht- floor both being dry. With the shoe sole being . 
wet, and the floor dry, the coefficient of friction dropped . 
to 0.18, which is considerably below the 0.4 standard. · 
The label on the wax can instructs that after waxing 
a treatPd dust rnap shoitld b(', used to remove ordinary 
dfrt (See Affidavit of Douglas :MacGregor, Paragraph . 
10; R. 27 and Affidavit of Hughes Brockbank, R. 34). ' 
The failure of the defendants to nse a treated dust mop 
coupled with the long period between the actual waxing 
and the plaintiff's accident, created a dangerous situation , 
according to Mr. MacGregor. The dust mop or push 
broom does not pick np the dust which is incorporated 
into the wax surface by daily buffings. As a result the 
coefficient of friction becomes much lower and the floor 
hazardous (Affidavit of Douglas MacGregor, Paragraph 
10; R. 27). This is demonstrated graphically in Exhibit 
"A" attached to Mr. MacGregor's Affidavit (R. 29) which , 
shows the coefficient of friction at the time of the origi-
nal waxing to be 0.85 and after daily buffings to be as 
low as 0.15. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EXPERT EVIDENCE OF DOUGLAS MAC-
GREGOR PRESENTS EVIDENCE THAT THE 
FLOOR OF THE DEFENDANTS' RESTAURANT 
WAS DANGEROUS AND UNSAFE AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Mr. Douglas MacGregor, a mechanical engineer, pre· 
sented his opinion that the coefficient of friction of the . 
7 
floor at the time of the accident was so low that persons 
walking on the floor in a normal manner could easily 
slip and fall (R. 27, 28). He further states that anytime 
th<> coefficient of friction falls below 0.4 a slippery con-
<lition exists where people walking with normal care may 
slip (R. 27, 28). According to his tests, the coefficient 
of friction of the floor involved was considerably below 
0.4. 
There can be no question but that the Court should 
consider tests and experiments performed by Mr. Mac-
G rl'gor. Tests performed out of Court when they are 
made under similar circumstances and like conditions 
to those existing in the case at issue are admissible for 
considnation by the trier of the facts. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, 
E1 1idrncr, Section 818. The purpose of permitting such 
experiments is to aid the trier of the facts in determining 
thP iss1ws in the case. 
Expert testimony is admissible on the question 
whether the floor is as a matter of fact dangerously 
slippery. 63 A.L.R. 602. Coefficient of friction tests are 
the universally accepted factor for determining scien-
tifically the degree of slipperiness of a surface (See 
Affidavit of Douglas MacGregor, Paragraph 6; R. 25). 
This test measures the ease with which one surface will 
move in relation to another surface. For example, if 
thf' surface is ice it would take much less force to move 
a shoe across the surface and hence the coefficient of 
friction is far less than it would be on a more abrasive 
l'llrface. If the coefficient of friction of a floor where 
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large gronps of 1wople are required to walk is suffi. , 
cirntl>· low, the probabilities of people slipping becomes 
high and a hazardous condition exists. Consequently, 
thP tPsts of Mr. MacGregor have considerable probative 
valn<' as to wlwther an unsafe condition existed. at the 
time of thr accident. 
This sci en ti fie evidence shows that the floor was 
unsafe, which raises a fact issue to be determined by a 
JUry. 
POINT II. 
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DEFENDANTS 
MAINTAINED THE FLOOR OF THEIR PREMISES 
RAISES A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT FOR DETER-
MINATION BY THE JURY. 
One major area \v·here the defendants neglected their 
duty was their failure to follow the instruction on the 
wax can n~garding day-to-day cleaning of the waxed 
floor. 
'The wax can label directs that a treated dust mop 
be used in order to pick up the dust from the floor prior 
to buffing. 
Mr. Lee testified in his deposition that the daily 
maintenance of the floor consisted of going over the floor 
with a dry dust mop or push broom, and then buffing 
it with an rlectrieal buffing machine. Mr. MacGregor 
points out that the dry dust mop or pnsh broom does 
not pick np tJw dust on the floor; and as a result, the 
dust is buffrd into tlw waxed surface. This alters the 
wax0d surfacP reducing the coefficient of friction. Ac-
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r·ording to Mr. MacGn·gor the wax used was of such a 
qualit:-· that when it \Vas first applied the coefficient of 
friction was abov(• 0.4 which is considered safe for people 
to walk upon. Exhibit "A" attached to Mr. MacGregor's 
Affidavit (R. 29) dt>monstrates graphically how the sur-
face of the floor becomes more slippery by daily buffing 
accumulating dust into the waxed floor surface. About 
50 days after the waxing, the coefficient of friction falls 
below 0.4. In this case the defendants had not waxed 
thP floor for about 4% months or about 130 days. In 
Exhihit ''A" after buffing the floor daily for 95 times 
tlw eoeffieient of friction goes as low as 0.15. 
~Whether the defendants were negligent in not wax-
ing their floors more frequently and in failing to follow 
instructions on the label of the wax can for cleaning is 
an issuP of fact that cannot be determined as a matter 
of law. 
POINT III. 
THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT 
HAVE A WIPE-UP MAT OR ANY OTHER FLOOR 
COVERING ON THE FLOOR AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT RAISES A TRIABLE ISSUE OF 
FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY A JURY. 
'l'hP defendants operate a business catering to a 
gn·at rnltrntP of people. Their business is located in the 
crnt(T of the Salt Lake City business district. Although 
1lw <·vidPnce at this stage does not bring out the total 
ltLHnbt•r of people that would patronize their business in 
the f•onnw of a month, or even a day, the munber would 
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be considerable since Mr. Lamb stated that over 200 · 
people patronized his restaurant in one morning (Depo. 
sition of Mr. Lamb, Page 21, Line 21). 
It is clear that at the fame of the accident and for 
most of the morning prior to the accident, it was raining 
and sleeting outside and the streets and pavement werf' , 
wet. As the plain6ff walked to Lamb's Grill her feet 
became wet from the wet sid(~walk (See Affidavit of 
Olive Preston). She walked from the wet pavement onto 
the waxed floor. Everyone has had the experience of ' 
stepping on a waxed floor with wet feet and recognizes · 
the hazard involved. Here, we have a business which 
patronizes to over 200 people in one morning, yet the 
defendants took no precaution as to the safety of the 
people entering or leaving their premises with regard 
to their floor. 
It is recognized that failure to provide mats or other 
abrasive covering has been viewed as negligence. Erick· 
son v. Walgre<>.11 Drug Cornpany, 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 
210, 213 (1951); Pegnatelli v. Gi'-mble Bros., 285 App. Div. ' 
625, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 23 (1955); Wakefidd v. Levin, 118 Vt.' 
394, 110 A.2d 712 ( 1955). Obviously, it would be improper 
to wax and polish an outside terazzo or tile floor sincr 
rain or snow would make it extremely hazardous. Is it . 
not equally as hazardous to maintain a waxed and pol·, 
ished floor for people who have wet feet to walk upon 
when thev enh~r. Wipe-up mats or other floor covering 
are certainly a wise solution to the problem and failurr 
to provide them creates a qn08tion of fact as to whether· 
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or not the defendants exercised that degree of care which 
n'asonable persons would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RE-
VERSED BECAUSE THERE IS EVIDENCE FOUND 
IN THE DEPOSITIONS, PLEADINGS, AND AFFI-
DAVITS ON FILE WHICH CREATES TRIABLE 
ISSUES OF FACT. 
f n this case the plainbff is a business invitee and 
the deft>ndants owe her the duty to exercise reasonable 
care to keep their premises reasonably safe for such 
invitees. De TTl eese v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 
297 P.'.2d 898 (1956); Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 
supra. Moreover, the owners of a business have the duty 
to search out and discover concealed defects. Erickson 
v. Wal,f}reen Drug Co., supra. 
The defendants rely upon the case of Gaddis v. 
LadiPs Literary Club, 4 Utah 2d 121, 288 P.2d 785 (1955), 
which is distinguished from the case at hand. In the 
Gaddis case, an order granting a motion to dismiss made 
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence was upheld by 
this 8ourt. It was upheld because the only evidence pro-
ducPd at trial was that the plaintiff fell on a waxed floor. 
Then~ was no showing in support of an allegation in the 
complaint that the wax was applied "in a reckless man-
nPr," or "in an extreme quantity," or that is was "of an 
inferior quality." Neither was there any evidence offered 
by Gaddis that the floor was of such a composition which 
12 
wonld render the application of wax dangerons or that 
the composition of "the wax" was such as to create a 
danger in its nse. Had there been such a showing there 
would have hren evidence from which a jury could infer 
negligence and the dismissal would have been reversed. 
The following rule was stated: 
'" ... som<> condition beyond the fact that the 
floor \Yas waxed and that the plaintiff fell is 
n<'e<Jssar~· to a cause of action for negligence in 
cr1c•ating or permitting a dangerous condition to 
exist where people are expected to walk. The 
proof did not meet this test. .. " 
In this case we have: (1) a highly polished floor, 
(2) defendants failing to follow waxing instruction, (3) 
use of a non-treated dust mop, ( 4) wax on for over 41/z 
months which causes it to lose its abrasive qualities, and 
( 5) scientific proof of an unsafe condition. 
Tlw courts consistently uphold verdicts where there 
1s evidence, t~Yen if it is slight, in addition to the fact 
that the plaintiff slipped on a waxed floor. For example, 
in the case of "Wilson v. Payne, 74 Nev. 312, 330 P.2d 102 
(1958), the> Nevada court held that waxing a floor was 
negligent when people were required to ·walk on the wax 
in their stocking feet. The case involved a situation 
where the dt>fendant owned a beauty salon and people 
frpquently walked on the floor in their stocking feet. 
In anotht•r casP, the mere fact that the floor slanted and 
was slipper~' "~as sufficiPnt to uphold a verdict for the 
plaintiff. Kf'r11s r. F. Tl'. TVoolworth Co., 138 Mont. 249, 
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:356 P.2d 127 (1960). In a Washington Supreme Court 
case it was held that where there was evidence for the 
plaintiff showing a skid mark on the floor in the wax 
and waxing compound on the plaintiff's shoes, a jury 
question was raised. Miller v. Payless Driig Store, Inc., 
Gl Wash. 2d 651, 379 P.2d 932 (1963). See also Clayton 
L'. .!. C. Penmey Co., 8 Cal. Rep. 712 (1960). In the case 
of Ed-wards v. Ross, 72 N.M. 38, 380 P.2d 188 (1963), 
there was evidence that the wax on the floor could not 
have been removed entirely by the cleaning operation 
and that the cleaning done might have stirred up old 
wax and increased slipperiness of some spots of the 
floor. This was held to be sufficient for a jury question 
as to whether or not a hazardous condition existed. 
The plaintiff is entitled to have all her evidence and 
any and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom 
viewed in a light most favorable to her. Thompson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 63 (1964); Bul-
lock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 
354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960). The facts of her affidavits on 
summary judgment must be accepted as true. Eagle Oil 
& Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 
(1942); Severini v. Massai, 140 C.A.2d 567, 295 P.2d 472 
(1956). 
In all cases the paramount objective of the courts is 
to render justice between the parties. Dismissal on Sum-
mary Judgment is a drastic action and is not favored. 
For this reason the courts should be reluctant to invoke 
the remedy since it prevents the opportunity from fully 
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presenting the case to the court. Brandt v. Springville 
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). 
The rule is that if from the affidavits there is suf-
ficient uncertainty that reasonable minds might differ 
as to the conclusions that the summary judgment should 
1 
be reversed. Robinson v. Robinson, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 
P.2d 876 (1964). Moreover, if there is doubt the case 
should be resolved in favor of safeguarding the right 
to a jury trial. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., supra. 
There is ample evidence that the defendants failed 
to exercise reasonable care and that the floor was unsafe. 
Particularly, since plaintiff's evidence must be viewed 
in a light most favorable to her. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions 
most favorable to the plaintiff, the following facts must 
be assumed to be true: 
1. That the floor was highly polished; 
2. That the coefficient of friction was considerably 
below a safe standard and the floor was unsafe and haz-
ardous to people walking upon it in a normal manner; 
3. That the defendants failed to follow waxing in-
structions; 
4. That the defendants used a non-treated dust mop; 
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5. rrhat the delay in re-waxing the floor for a period 
of 4% months caused the floor to lose its abrasive quali-
ties; 
G. That the defendants failed to put out wipe-up 
mats or other floor covering for the protection of people 
walking upon their floor with wet feet. 
The plaintiff-appellant respectfully submits that 
these raise material issues of fact as to whether the 
defendants were negligent and that the summary judg-
ment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MABEY, BRADFORD & 
MARSDEN 
By-·-·--------------------------------------------
J. Fred Wright 
1700 University Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
